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The Logic and Limits of Chapter 9:
The Case of Police
Nathan E. Enfieldt
I. INTRODUCTION
The American city has entered a difficult era in which it must
confront the problem of providing police services without sufficient
funds to pay for them. Indeed, at least twenty-eight urban
municipalities' have declared bankruptcy or entered state receiverships
since 2007.2 By necessity, local officials have looked to their state
insolvency regimes for support as they try to provide baseline police
services in the midst of financial crisis. Scholarly commentators, too,
have responded to this decline in municipal health by reevaluating the
aims of state and federal insolvency laws governing local responses to
crisis. 3 In this critical moment for insolvency law, Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code has assumed greater prominence, as some think it
provides the tools needed to solve problems that could not otherwise be
dealt with during periods of normal, non-emergency politics.4
t B.A. 2012, Northwestern University; J.D. Candidate 2017, The University of Chicago
Law School.
"Municipality" means any "political subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a
State," consistent with the Bankruptcy Code's definition under 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2010). The
definition includes cities and towns, but, as used here, does not include places where city and
county governments have merged into a single municipal entity, or apply to arrangements where a
single city expands across various counties. San Francisco is an example of the former, while New
York City illustrates the latter.
2 See Monica Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Billions in Debt, Detroit Tumbles into
Insolvency, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 18, 2013), http: //www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/us/detroit-files-for-
bankruptcy.html [https://perma.cc/NK9B-3TSC]. When a city is in receivership that usually
means the state is monitoring its affairs to prevent further decline.
See, e.g., Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1128-29
(2014) (arguing that recent austerity measures in American cities have resulted in a shortage of
public services, and cuts in police budgets should be constrained by minimum public safety
standards).
See, e.g., Henry J. Feinberg, Pass a Bankruptcy Law, Give Taxpayers a Chance, CHI. TRIB.
(May 5, 2015, 6:27 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.comlnews/opinion/commentary/ct-illinois-
bankruptcy-perspec-0506-20 150505-story.html [https: //perma.cc /3MKT-GESH] (arguing that a bill
allowing municipalities in Illinois to file for bankruptcy should include a provision that gives state
bondholders a secured first lien).
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This Comment contributes to the greater conversation about
policing within distressed municipalities by reminding commentators of
what insolvency law can and cannot accomplish. It argues that, given
statutory constraints and bankruptcy courts' limited ability to do
equity, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code is best suited to provide a
city relief from its police crisis when the overarching source of a public-
safety problem is too much debt, as opposed to structural breakdowns
in police governance or an exodus of residents that leaves a city unable
to raise taxes to pay for police services.
To be sure, cities carrying too much debt may not be able to raise
enough revenue to pay for desired services because residents leave for
different locales that can provide better mixes of public goods, so the
problems do overlap.5 But the litmus test for whether bankruptcy can
remedy a distressed municipality's police crisis should be whether the
perceived problem would still exist in a world where the city had
resources sufficient to meet residents' demands. 6 If the city would
experience the same shortcomings in policing whether solvent or
insolvent, then bankruptcy would not provide sustainable relief.7 The
Comment illustrates this principle by examining how three
municipalities-Detroit, Michigan; Camden, New Jersey; and Stockton,
California-confronted deficits in police services while experiencing
financial distress.
The Comment expounds upon this point about the proper limits of
Chapter 9 by proposing several doctrinal solutions to obstacles that
keep bankruptcy courts from solving deficiencies in police services. The
first problem is that while bankruptcy courts across the country
recognize that they have the authority to restructure obligations
hampering a city's ability to pay for necessary police services,8 police
s See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 448 (1993) ("Unusually high rates
of taxation also discourage economic activity and create an incentive for business and higher
income taxpayers to depart the jurisdiction. Wealthier citizens and business are not only very
sensitive to changes in tax rates but are also the groups most capable of relocating in order to
escape the new tax burden.").
6 This approach is consistent with the framework deployed in corporate reorganizations
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: a firm that is insolvent due to a lack of market demand
should be liquidated because a change in capital structure cannot change the fact that there is a
lack of demand for its services, while a firm that consumers otherwise do find desirable can benefit
from a reorganization because market forces are not causing its insolvency. See DOUGLAS G.
BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 58-59 (5th ed. 2010). The problem, however, is that this
approach does not map perfectly on to Chapter 9 because the statute prohibits a court from
liquidating a municipality. See infra Part II.A.
'Insolvent" means the municipality either "is generally not paying its debts as they become
due" or "unable to pay its debts as they become due." 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C)(i)-(ii) (2010).
8 See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 150 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (holding that
Michigan's statutory ban on impairing pension obligations in bankruptcy was preempted by
Chapter 9); In re City of Stockton, 526 B.R. 35, 54 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that a
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pensioners fare much better in restructurings than do other creditor
groups.9 The result is that a city may be ensnared by the proverbial
"death spiral" in which it emerges from one bankruptcy only to find
itself back in court a few years later because it is again defaulting on
obligations that should have been restructured more aggressively
during the first proceeding. 10 To remedy this problem, the Comment
articulates a balancing test that judges can use to ensure a
municipality's long-term interest in being able to access capital
markets is not sacrificed to appease the short-term impulses of
dominant constituencies, like police unions, during negotiations.
Second, because Chapter 9 can only provide an awkward fix at best for
a crisis in police governance, the Comment proposes that states craft
their insolvency laws so that emergency managers are empowered to
address structural collapses in police decision making processes.
Relying on bankruptcy courts to fix this aspect of the police problem is
simply unlikely to work.
Part II of the Comment provides an overview of the federal law
governing municipalities that file for bankruptcy. It outlines the
eligibility requirements under Chapter 9 and the substantive laws
bankruptcy judges apply when confirming plans of reorganization. This
study of federal law is followed by an analysis of how non-uniform state
laws set parameters for police reform in the midst of crisis. Part III
then examines the root causes of the three police crises that are the
subject of the Comment. When looking at each city's police crisis, it
contemplates how state and federal law could have alleviated the public
safety shortcomings, if at all, in light of the constraints examined in
Part II. The thesis of Part III is that, of the three cases, Chapter 9 can
only solve the police problem in Stockton because it arose from a
pension burden rather than a governance breakdown or a flight of
taxpayers that could have provided the internal financing for police
services. In Part IV, the Comment explains how the solutions proposed
above can enhance the powers of bankruptcy judges and state
insolvency regimes to remedy police crises. Part V concludes by
summarizing the key points of the Comment and connecting the
arguments back to the fundamental aims of insolvency law.
California law prohibiting the rejection of pension obligations in bankruptcy was preempted by
Chapter 9).
In the Detroit plan of reorganization, for example, police pensioners blocked a cut in their
pension obligations and agreed to a reduction in the cost of living adjustments instead. Other
workers took a 4.5% cut in their pensions and also gave up an annual cost of living adjustment. In
re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 179 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
10 See Michael Corkery & Mary Williams Walsh, Puerto Rico's Governor Says Island's Debts
are 'Not Payable', N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/29/business/
dealbook/puerto-ricos-governor-says-islands-debts-are-not-payable.html [https://perma.cc/KUT3-L
56S] (noting that Puerto Rico could be caught in a "death spiral" if it does not expand its economy).
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II. FEDERAL AND STATE MUNICIPAL INSOLVENCY LAWS
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code outlines the federal
requirements that municipalities must follow when using a judicial
process to restructure their debt obligations." Cities can only obtain
federal protection from creditors under Chapter 9 once they have
satisfied prerequisites at the state level.12 The local laws are intended
to give municipalities a chance to restructure their debts outside of
bankruptcy. 13 Even then, states must grant their municipalities the
authority to file for protection under Chapter 9.14 The result of this
interplay is a context-specific process. Indeed, while the municipalities
examined in this Comment all maintained the ability to file for
bankruptcy, the insolvency laws in each state varied in key respects.
A. Proving Eligibility and Confirming the Plan of Reorganization
Under Chapter 9
The following subsection provides an overview of the relevant
aspects of federal bankruptcy law that all municipalities must comply
with once they file under Chapter 9. The Comment then examines state
insolvency laws that impact a financially distressed municipality even
if it does not end up in bankruptcy. For reasons that will be discussed
further below, the Comment argues that the best chance a municipality
has to enact structural police reforms occurs in the run-up to a Chapter
9 filing, when the municipality is still operating within the confines of
its state insolvency regime.15
1. Eligibility.
A municipality must satisfy Chapter 9's eligibility requirement to
survive claims that its bankruptcy petition was filed in bad faith.16
Eligibility turns on whether the municipality meets Chapter 9's
definition of "insolvent." An "insolvent" municipality is one that is
" See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2010).
1 See id.
1 See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE STATE ROLE IN LOcAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL
DISTRESS: As CITIES CONFRONT FINANcIAL CHALLENGES, STATES WEIGH WHETHER TO HELP THEM
PULL THROUGH 14 (2013), http://www.pewtrusts. org/-/media/assets/2013/07/23/pew staterole
in-local-government-financial-distress.pdf'la=en [https://perma.cc/9VXX-SCD6].
14 See, e.g., CAL. Gov. CODE § 53760.3 (2016).
15 "Structural police reform," as used throughout the Comment, refers to fundamental
concerns like who within a department gets to choose a police strategy, how will that decision be
filtered through vetogates in the municipal government, how can discretion be concentrated in
certain decision makers' hands so that different policies can be implemented, and so forth. It is
used in contrast to issues related to on-the-ground compliance.
16 See 11 U.S.C. § 921(c) (2010).
[2016742
THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF CHAPTER 9
"generally not paying its debts as they become due" or "unable to pay
its debts as they become due."17 Determining whether a municipality is
generally unable to pay its debts under § 101(32)(C)(ii) requires
bankruptcy judges to make predictions about how feasible it will be for
the municipality to raise revenue in light of its current financial
distress.18 Although this determination is rooted in an accounting
calculus, individuals who view the financial situation differently and
may well have an interest in stopping the proceedings altogether can
appeal the eligibility ruling.19
As indicated by recent case law, eligibility is also a function of the
municipality's ability to police its communities. 20 Presenting evidence of
"service delivery insolvency," which describes a municipality that is
unable to fund public health and public safety initiatives at a scale
necessary to promote the general welfare, can tip the balance in favor
of the municipal debtor.2 1 This is a noteworthy development because
courts have in the past imposed high burdens of proof on cities that
claimed drops in public safety supported a finding of municipal
insolvency. 22
2. The municipal plan of reorganization.
Once a municipality is deemed insolvent and thus eligible for
bankruptcy, it must restructure obligations to creditors so that it can
avoid future defaults. 23 A reorganization plan can adjust a debtor's
obligations in a number of ways, ranging from extending maturities of
principal repayments, to reducing interest or principal amounts, among-
7 Id. at §§ 101(32)(C)(i)-(ii) (2010).
Satisfying the requirement can present a difficult evidentiary burden for municipal
debtors. See, e.g., In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 338-39 (Bankr. D. CT. 1991) (finding that
the municipality had not carried its burden of proving service delivery insolvency despite clear
financial distress).
1 See Christopher Hopkins & Andrea Saavedra, The Statutory Definition of "Insolvent"- Part
Two - Chapter 9 Debtors, WEIL BANKRUPTCY BLOG (Nov. 5, 2013), http://business-finance-
restructuring.weil.com/chapter-9/the-statutory-definition-of-insolvent-part-two-chapter-9-debtors/
[https://perma.cclZ7B3-ZSHY] (explaining that pension holders and other interest groups have
reasons to oppose a bankruptcy filing because they may not collect the full extent of what they are
owed after a restructuring of the city's debts).
20 See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 112 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) ("The City no
longer has the resources to provide its residents with the basic police . . . services that its residents
need for their basic health and safety."); In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 789-90 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. 2013) ("The crime rate has soared. Homicides are at record levels. The City has among the ten
highest rates in the nation of aggravated assaults with a firearm. Police often respond only to
crimes-in-progress.").
2 See Hopkins & Saavedra, supra note 19 (discussing service delivery insolvency in the run-
up to Stockton's bankruptcy filing).
22 See id. (arguing that In re City of Bridgeport is precedent for this narrow interpretation of
§ 101(32)(C)).
2 See 11 U.S.C. § 941 (2010) (discussing the "plan for the adjustment of the debtor's debts").
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other alternatives. 24 Chapter 9 gives a debtor time and protection from
claimants so that it can assemble a reorganization plan that the judge
must confirm before ruling that the city is eligible to exit bankruptcy.25
While modeled after Chapter 11 reorganizations to an extent, Chapter
9 plans are substantively different from corporate reorganizations in
four relevant respects. Recognizing these differences can help elucidate
what a municipal bankruptcy can and cannot do for a distressed
municipality seeking to improve its police services.26
First, despite a similar requirement for corporate debtors, courts
do not, as threshold matter, ask whether the municipality is financially
insolvent and should thus be reorganized, or whether the municipality
should be liquidated because it is economically insolvent and a new
organizational scheme will not alleviate its problems. 27 When a
corporation is financially insolvent, its liabilities can exceed assets due
to a combination of burdensome debts and poor management. It may
benefit from a reorganization, therefore, because the plan can put
assets to their highest productive use once certain impediments to
profitability, like a poor executive officer, are removed.28 Economically
insolvent entities, on the other hand, suffer from a lack of market
demand for their services that a change in capital structure or
management cannot repair.29 Reorganizing such a debtor would not
help anyone because bankruptcy law cannot solve a problem rooted in
market dynamics. 30 The economically insolvent entity should thus be
liquidated under Chapter 7 because selling the assets to their highest-
valued user is the value-maximizing solution.31 However, Congress
prohibits liquidation of municipalities by placing them beyond the
reach of Chapter 7.32 Even if there is staggering population decline, an
exodus of corporate taxpayers, and other signs that municipal
"consumers" do not demand the city's services, Chapter 9 anticipates
that the city will have a future.
Second, even though Chapter 9 presumes the municipality will
continue to exist after bankruptcy, it restricts the ability of judges to
change a city's government structure. 33 Under § 904, "the court may
24 See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01(1) (Alan N. Resnick and Henry J. Sommer eds.,
16th ed., 2015).
25 id.
26 Id. at T 900.01(2).
27 See id. at T 900.01(1).




3 See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 24, at T 900.0 1(1).
* See 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2010) ("Limitation on jurisdiction and powers of court").
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not, by any stay, order, or decree, in the case or otherwise, interfere
with . . . any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor"
unless the municipality consents or the plan of reorganization bestows
such power on the court. 34 Court-imposed changes to the structures of
corporate debtors are hallmarks of Chapter 11 reorganizations, but
Congress has limited this power in the municipal context, despite calls
for a more robust system enabling courts to alter the structural make-
ups of city governments. 35 Limiting the court's authority to financial
matters is a striking policy choice because chronic financial difficulties
severe enough to justify eligibility for bankruptcy could signal that the
municipal government is broken. 36 Indeed, in the case of police, a
bankruptcy judge could recognize that the long-term viability of a local
department depends on getting the right person to serve as chief of
police, conferring or limiting the discretion of departmental leaders,
creating oversight boards or introducing some other reform, yet the
plain language of § 904 blocks such activism. As a result, restructuring
plans proposed in Chapter 9 are designed to adjust financial obligations
while ignoring structural breakdowns, thereby providing only
temporary improvements in police services if the deficiency stems from
a flaw in governance. 37
Third, in contrast to corporate debtors, municipalities have greater
freedom to reject collective bargaining agreements in bankruptcy.3 8
Section 1113 only allows corporate debtors to reject such agreements as
part of Chapter 11 reorganizations once they have made good faith
efforts to negotiate with employee unions, but Chapter 9 does not
contain a similar limitation. 39 Thus, cities in theory have more leverage
" Id.
* See Clayton P. Gillette & David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance Reform and the Judicial Role in
Municipal Bankruptcy, 125 YALE L.J. 1150, 1153-1156 (2016).
1 See McConnell & Picker, supra note 5, at 470 ("In the case of business corporations, we
readily recognize that the entity's size and scope of operations can be changed, and even that the
corporation can be liquidated altogether. Is it not equally true that a municipal corporation's size
and scope of operations could be changed? And that bankruptcy signals the need for fundamental
reform of the city's structure and affairs?").
" But see id. at 474-75 (suggesting that courts can introduce structural changes in police
governance by simply refusing to confirm a plan proposed by the municipal debtor unless it
includes such reforms). While this approach complies with the text of § 904, it may not be a
workable way around the language because it requires the municipality to implement changes it
finds undesirable, and state laws or city charters might raise legal obstacles to the court's vision of
what the police department should look like outside of bankruptcy.
* See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2010). Rejecting a contract in bankruptcy means the debtor can
breach and pay damages. Beneficiaries of the contract will then have an unsecured claim against
the municipality, and can expect to recover less as a result of their lower priority status. See
McConnell & Picker, supra note 5, at 467.
" See Stephen J. Lubben, Bankruptcy's Odd Twist with Union Contracts, N.Y. TIMES (March
2, 2012, 1:20 PM), http: Idealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/02/bankruptcys-odd-twist-with-union-
contracts/?-r=0 [https://perma.cc/YA4K-UU7F].
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over a counterparty like a police union that may threaten to holdup a
reorganization that compromises its interests. Nevertheless, the
dynamics of negotiation may make municipal debtors reluctant to
strike hard bargains with city employees during bankruptcy because
they represent a powerful voting bloc that can provide crucial support
for a proposed restructuring plan.40 Cities recognize that a plan with
public-worker support behind it can be confirmed more quickly, and
this reality can tilt negotiations in the workers' favor.
The fourth relevant difference between Chapters 9 and 11 is that
only the debtor can propose a plan of reorganization during a municipal
bankruptcy.4 1 Creditors may propose their own plans of reorganization
under Chapter 11 if they think the debtor's proposal unreasonably
impairs their interests or if they believe the debtor's plan is not
feasible. 42 This difference between the two Chapters creates a special
dynamic in Chapter 9 because the municipal debtor can still use the
cramdown power outlined in Chapter 11.43 A cramdown allows the
court to approve a plan proposed by the debtor even if some classes of
creditors oppose it and their opposition denies the debtor the necessary
majority for court confirmation of the reorganization. 4 4
But the ability to cramdown a plan over creditor opposition does
not give municipal debtors carte blanche to propose any set of terms
and force lenders to agree to them. Instead, cramdowns are governed by
various legal doctrines that protect creditors' interests. For example,
like cramdowns under Chapter 11, cramdowns in the municipal context
must be "fair and equitable," meaning the plan must incorporate the
absolute priority rule requiring payment to senior creditors in full
before any junior creditor may be paid at all.4 5
The plan must also be "in the best interests of creditors and ...
feasible."4 6 The recent opinion approving Detroit's eligibility to exit
bankruptcy may have clarified some aspects of the "best interests"
4o See, e.g., Nathan Bomey & Matt Helms, Retired Police, Firefighters Reach Deal with
Detroit, USA TODAY (April 15, 2014, 5:43 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2014/04/15/detroit-bankruptcy-pensions/7728569/ [https://perma.cc/3KCF-AJSK] (discussing the
importance of police and firefighters to a speedy restructuring because they held such large
claims).
41 See 11 U.S.C. § 941 (2010).
42 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2010).
43 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 1129(b) (2010).
4 See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 24, at 1 900.02[2](e)(ii).
" See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2010) (indicating that any confirmed plan of reorganization
must be "fair and equitable"). Courts interpret "fair and equitable" to mean that vertical priority
must be respected in a reorganization even though the Bankruptcy Code does not refer to the term
"absolute priority" that reflects this concept. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308
U.S. 106, 116-119 (1939).
4 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7).
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doctrine. The opinion reasoned that the proposed plan altering the
city's obligations was in the best interests of creditors because it
provided more than they could reasonably expect under the
circumstances and was a better alternative than dismissal of the
proceeding altogether. 47 After In re Detroit, the test seems to stand for
the proposition that creditors in a municipal bankruptcy should recover
at least as much as they would outside of Chapter 9. As a result, courts
evaluate the plan according to whether it provides a better outcome
than creditors would otherwise get if they raced to the courthouse for a
writ of mandamus ordering the city to pay its debts.48
The feasibility requirement means there is a reasonable prospect
that the municipal debtor will be able to make the payments it agreed
to as part of the restructuring. 49 Courts look at past and projected tax
revenues and expenses to determine whether the city will have funds
available to fulfill its commitments to creditors outlined under the
plan.50 But because there is an upper limit on a municipality's taxing
power before residents leave for places with lower tax rates, the court
must find that the amount of revenues that will be raised was all that
creditors could reasonably expect.51
The upshot of these rules governing plan confirmation is that the
feasibility requirement sets the maximum amount that a city must pay
to creditors while the fair and equitable doctrine establishes the
minimum creditors must receive under any plan that the debtor
proposes using the cramdown power.52 In practice, courts establish
these minima and maxima by balancing creditors' interest in receiving
a more complete recovery against the city's need to address its service
delivery insolvency. 53 But if the crisis in public services is severe
enough, this balancing act will almost always tilt in favor of better
settlements for public employees, in particular police officers, who are
likely to argue that they need a greater share of municipal resources to
do their jobs and retain members of the force. 54 In Detroit, for example,
the hardship imposed on the city by its inability to keep residents safe
47 See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 212-19 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
4 See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 24, at T 943.03(7)(a).
4 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-686, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-33 (1975).
5o See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 222-23.
51 See American Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 148 (1940).
52 See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 24, at ¶ 943.03[1][fJ(i)(A).
" See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 261-262 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
" See, e.g., TESTIMONY OF THOMAS MOERS MAYER, HEARING OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES' COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY'S SUBCOMMITTEE ON REGULATORY REFORM,
COMMERCIAL AND ANTITRUST LAW ON H.R. 870: "PUERTO RICO CHAPTER 9 UNIFORMITY ACT OF
2015" (Feb. 26, 2015), 14, http: Ijudiciary.house.gov/ cache/files/b7832791-b261-4fd8-adc4-5a4117a
52339/thomas-mayer-testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/RVQ3-KTKV].
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justified confirming a plan over private bondholder's objections that
police pensioners should have given up more during negotiations.55
Thus, in light of this recent application of the doctrine, the fair and
equitable test may not provide much protection for creditors who want
to ensure there is as small a spread as possible between the maximum
amount the city must raise in taxes under the best-interests test and
the minimum they can expect to receive.
When looking at how such doctrines can promote a more favorable
climate for police officers, courts as well as commentators must
precisely identify the obstacles to better policing within the
municipality. If debt obligations are preventing a more efficient
allocation of resources toward public safety programs, then arguably
the fair and equitable test should not inure to the benefit of lenders. On
the other hand, if the issue is structural-i.e., if the police department
is hamstrung by an external body constraining its discretion, or if a city
cannot raise revenues and must depend on state funding for police
services-then the justification for sacrificing creditor interests is less
compelling because debt is not the overarching problem. Noting this
distinction is important because how creditors fare in bankruptcy will
inform bargaining over municipal bonds in the future. Indeed, lenders
who believe that judges are not sensitive to the underlying causes of
service delivery insolvency could be chilled from future investments
because they worry that the fair and equitable doctrine provides hollow
protection.
B. The Gatekeeping Function of States
While federal bankruptcy laws apply uniformly to all
municipalities eligible to file under Chapter 9, the process in the run-up
to bankruptcy can vary in four discrete ways depending on state law. In
general, the process unfolds as follows. First, the city experiences
distress, which is associated with widening budget deficits, an inability
to meet payroll requirements, or carry out essential serviceS. 56 Second,
if municipal officials respond to the distress with a combination of
service cuts, worker layoffs, tax and fee increases, reserve spending or
borrowing, and those measures fail, then the distress can escalate into
a crisis or financial emergency declared by the state.57 Third, if a state-
appointed emergency manager cannot shepherd the municipality
through its crisis and get creditors to agree to a restructuring of the
city's obligations, then the municipality could be eligible to file for
'5 See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 257.
16 See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 13, at 8.
6 Id.
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bankruptcy protection under Chapter 9.58 Finally, if the city is eligible
for bankruptcy under Chapter 9, the court must confirm a plan of
reorganization of the city's debts before it can exit bankruptcy and
return to normal politics.5 9 As explained in more detail below, the
Comment argues that the best chance to enact structural police reforms
is in the second phase of this process, when an emergency manager
governs the municipality.
This is only the general course a municipality might follow because
not all state-appointed emergency managers enjoy the same degree of
latitude to govern cities in crisis. The insolvency statutes passed by
each state's legislature delimits the power vested in emergency
managers. Michigan, for example, vests considerable authority in its
emergency managers, permitting them to make changes to the
governmental structure of a municipality.6 0 By contrast, California only
permits its neutral evaluators to participate in restructuring financial
obligations-governmental or managerial changes are not within the
scope of their powers. 61
C. Seizing the Opportunity to Enact Structural Police Reform
Reformers likely have the best chance to enact structural changes
in a police force once the state appoints an emergency manager to guide
the city through its crisis. Given the limitation under § 904 prohibiting
a judge from making changes in the governmental makeup of a
municipal entity, bankruptcy courts have only a limited capacity to
impose structural reforms on a police department. 62 But emergency
managers do not have to comply with this limitation under Chapter 9.
Thus, the critical moment during a municipality's decline-when the
city is in crisis but not yet in bankruptcy-seems to be the ideal
situation to use the tools of insolvency law to make lasting change. To
see why, consider a police department that is suffering from a
governmental breakdown in the form of an inept police chief. Waiting
until the municipality has filed for bankruptcy to remove this officer
will likely not succeed because the court's ability to change personnel is
limited under § 904. By contrast, a state-appointed emergency manager
can make such a change without having to comply with the restrictions
in the Bankruptcy Code.
" Id. at 12.
9 Id.
6 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1549(9)(2) (2012).
"6 See CAL. Gov. CODE § 53760.3 (2016).
62 See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
739] 749
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
Authority to enact change of this sort necessarily depends on the
grant of power from the state legislature.63 As a result, municipalities
in states that give their emergency managers greater latitude to
restructure the organization of police decision making are better
positioned to emerge from a crisis on a more sustainable path.
Recognizing the relative capacities of state insolvency regimes as
compared to federal bankruptcy law under Chapter 9 underscores the
fundamental point that reformers must look to the right body of law to
find the relief they seek. Bankruptcy is better equipped to solve the
financial problem, while state insolvency laws can more directly
address the governance problem through emergency managers.
III. CASE STUDIES OF POLICE REFORM IN THE MIDST OF
FINANCIAL CRISIS
Examining the experiences of different distressed municipalities as
they attempted to use insolvency law to improve their police services
can provide valuable lessons for reform. Moreover, acknowledging
nuances across various forms of police crises in distressed
municipalities can illustrate the important but often overlooked insight
that not all police crises have the same causes. While the symptoms of
each crisis may have some overlap-in terms of rising crime rates and
understaffed forces-this Part argues that the root cause of police
failure in each city was substantively different, and that Chapter 9 of
the Bankruptcy Code is equipped to resolve only one of them, namely
the problem of excess debt manifested in Stockton.
Part III looks first at the proceedings in Detroit, which constituted
the largest municipal bankruptcy in American history.64 It then
examines the dissolution of Camden's police force outside of
bankruptcy, followed by the police crisis in Stockton as it navigated
through its own bankruptcy. Together, the three municipalities span a
gamut that is useful for analytical purposes. Of the three states,
Michigan gives its municipalities the greatest freedom to use
bankruptcy as a means to resolve financial crises, while also giving
emergency managers considerable power to make changes necessary to
improve local government. New Jersey, by contrast, limits the collective
ability of its municipalities to enter bankruptcy by aggressively
intervening in local affairs following initial signs of trouble. California
falls in between these two extremes, as it permits municipalities to
" Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1549(9)(2) (2012) with CAL. GoV. CODE § 53760.3 (2016).
6 See Davey & Marsh, supra note 2 (noting that the Detroit bankruptcy was of an
unprecedented scale).
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enter bankruptcy but does not permit neutral evaluators to meddle
with local affairs beyond restructuring financial obligations.6 5
Schematically, the insolvency laws in each state can be understood
as follows:
STATE MICHIGAN CALIFORNIA NEW JERSEY
CHARACTER Aggressive insolvency Limited power vested Aggressive
OF LOCAL laws that empower in neutral evaluators, intervention in
INSOLVENCY emergency managers to who may only address local affairs by the
LAWS make financial and financial matters. state government
governmental changes. that is meant to
prevent bankruptcy
filings.
ELIGIBILITY Permits municipalities Permits municipalities Reluctant to permit
TO FILE FOR to file for bankruptcy to file for bankruptcy municipalities to
BANKRUPTCY under Chapter 9. under Chapter 9. file for bankruptcy
under Chapter 9.
A. Detroit's Board of Police Commissioners and the Failure of
Fragmentation
Michigan's Governor Rick Snyder appointed Kevyn Orr as
emergency manager of Detroit in March, 2013.66 An accomplished
restructuring attorney, Orr had experience representing Chrysler, a
major automobile manufacturer with U.S. headquarters in Michigan,
during its bankruptcy in 2009.67 This fact was not lost on local
representatives, as the governor's choice of a restructuring expert to
manage the city signaled that a bankruptcy filing was no longer a
remote possibility.6 8 Despite concerns about an emergency manager
having too much power, Orr assumed his office with a broad statutory
mandate to do what he thought was necessary to solve the city's
problems. 69 Public Act 436, the statute vesting the authority to govern
65 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
66 See Timeline: Detroit's Road Through Bankruptcy, DETROIT NEWS, http:lwww.detroitnews.
com/story/news/locallwayne-county/2014/11/07/timeline-detroits-road-bankruptcy/18654077/
[https://perma.cc/MCY2-QLNF].
67 See Monica Davey, Bankruptcy Lawyer is Named to Manage an Ailing Detroit, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/15/us/gov-rick-snyder-kevyn-orr-emergency-
manager-detroit.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc TGV3-T9CL].
68 Id.
69 Residents often protest emergency managers because of a perceived lack of democratic
legitimacy, and elected officials typically resent the emergency manager's power because their
authority is displaced by the institutional apparatus the manager puts in place to manage the
crisis, hence the resistance to Orr. See Clayton P. Gillette, Dictatorships for Democracy: Takeovers
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Detroit in Orr, bestowed upon him "broad powers" to improve "the local
government's capacity to provide or cause to be provided necessary
governmental services essential to the public health, safety, and
welfare."70 This broad grant conceivably permitted Orr to reform the
governing structure of Detroit's police department. If so, then Orr had
authority to reshape the decision making process governing police
strategy, a process that appeared to start and end with Detroit's Board
of Police Commissioners.
The Board of Police Commissioners is a formidable check on the
chief of police's discretion. Deriving its authority from § 7-802 of
Detroit's City Charter, the eleven-member body has the following
responsibilities: conduct searches for a new chief of police and submit
its list of qualified candidates to the mayor, who then chooses a
candidate only from that list;71 establish policies, rules and regulations
in consultation with the new chief of police; 72 review and approve the
departmental budget before submitting it to the Mayor; 73 and act as
final authority in imposing or reviewing disciplinary sanctions of police
officers. 74 Crucially, § 7-802 also allows for the Board to be composed of
former officers from previous administrations whose interests might
diverge from the current chief of police's goals for the Department,
thereby exacerbating the tension between the two bodies.75 Seven of the
eleven members are elected to the Board from each of Detroit's seven
non at-large districts, while the mayor appoints the four remaining
commissioners.7 6
To put the power of the Board of Police Commissioners in
perspective, imagine a situation in which a new chief of police wants to
implement a series of different strategies. This could include an
initiative to increase the use of special prosecutors in police misconduct
of Financially Failed Cities, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1397-1405 (2014).
70 See MICH. COM7P. LAWS § 141.1549(9)(2) (2012).
71 See DETROIT, MICH., MUN. CODE § 7-805 (2012).
71 See id. at § 7-803(1) (2012).
7 See id. at § 7-803(2) (2012).
74 See id .at § 7-803(4) (2012).
7 Currently, four members of the Board of Police served under previous administrations. See
City of Detroit, Board of Police Commissioners, http://www.detroitmi.gov/Boards/Board
OfPoliceCommissioners [https://perma.cc/ZU8F-GZC4]. This composition approximates the
membership breakdown in the run-up to Detroit's filing for bankruptcy. See also Gillette & Skeel,
supra note 35, at 1189.
76 Detroit introduced a new City Charter effective January 1, 2013 that required voters to
elect officials from non at-large districts rather than from a pool drawing from the entire city
population. See David Sands, Detroit City Charter's New Council by Districts Could Change
Representation, City Services, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/01/04/detroit-city-charter-council-by-districts-n1 183264.html [https://perma.cc/5LL9-
WEKM]. Detroit's district system appears similar to Chicago's ward system in that both cities
divide their territories into electoral subgroups.
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investigations, changing how data is collected on fatalities involving
officers, conducting implicit bias trainings for all members of the force,
or some other reform to improve accountability. The first idea would
undercut the Board's authority since it has final say over officer
discipline pursuant to § 7-803(4), the second would at least require
consultation with the Board under § 7-803(1), and the third would
almost certainly require the Board to appropriate funds for such a
program under § 7-803(2).77 Enacting almost any policy currently under
discussion in police reform debates7 8 would require approval from the
Board, an organization that could be staffed entirely of police officers
from previous administrations and who oppose such changes.
The costs of such fragmented police decision making were quite
severe in the period leading up to Detroit's bankruptcy. From 2010 to
2012, two chiefs of police resigned following sex scandals involving
female officers.79 These controversies not only left the Department
without a permanent head following a two-year period that witnessed a
thirty-four percent increase in homicides, but also forced the Mayor to
wait-as required under the City Charter-for the Board to compose its
list of desired candidates, thereby increasing the cost of a prolonged
vetting period for a new chief.8 0 Furthermore, as might be expected of a
body heavily populated by commissioners who were themselves former
officers, the Board only proposed insider candidates currently working
within the Department to fill the opening.8 1 It was not until Orr took
office and assumed control over the search that Detroit filled the
position by appointing outsider James Craig, who returned to Detroit.
after long stints at other departments in Los Angeles, Portland, and
Cincinnati. 82 Finally, after appointing his desired candidate, Orr
n See DETROIT, MICH., MUN. CODE § 7-803(4), (1)-(2) (2012).
7 See, e.g., Michele L. Jawando & Chelsea Parsons, 4 Ideas that Could Begin to Reform the
Criminal Justice System and Improve Police-Community Relations, CENTER FOR AMERICAN
PROGRESS (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/civil-liberties/report/
20 14/12/18/103578/4-ideas-that-could-begin-to-reform-the-criminal-justice-system-and-improve-
police-community-relations/ [https://perma.ccllVL9-SLC3].
7 See Steven Yaccino, Detroit Police Chief Resigns Over Affair With Officer, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 8, 2012), http: //www.nytimes.com/2012/10/09/us/detroit-police-chief-forced-to-resign-amid-
sex-scandal.html?_r=o [https://perma.cc/MD6Q-7D48].
8 In total, the vetting process took seven months to complete, but might well have taken
longer had Orr not been appointed emergency manager during this period. See The Associated
Press, Former Portland Police Chief Named Top Cop in Detroit, CENTRALMAINE.COM (May 14,
2013), http:I/www.centralmaine.com/2013/05/14/former-portland-police-chief-heading-to-detroit/
[https: llperma.cc/JS47-3YMJ].
8 See Gina Damron & Matt Helms, Detroit's Police Chief: "I've Come Home," DETROIT FREE
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disbanded but did not abolish the Board as an oversight body. 83 This
policy choice supports the inference that Detroit's police crisis stemmed
from a fragmented decision making structure that was likely captured
by interests beholden to former officers rather than to the greater
polity.
Orr's decision to bypass the Board in this manner comports with
findings by criminologists and public choice scholars. Since crime rates
inform firms' decisions about where to locate and, in turn, pay local
taxes, 84 Detroit's inability to select the person who would choose among
various policing strategies likely contributed to the decline in its fiscal
health.85 In addition, the costs of fragmented decision making
structures probably outweigh any benefits when a body created to serve
as a check wants to promote the narrow interests of officers from
regimes past rather than the broad interests of the municipality.86
But what is most striking about the way Orr dealt with the Board
is that he did not use his statutory authority to disband the oversight
body altogether.87 Instead, by leaving it intact, Orr left the task of
reforming the structural makeup of the Police Department to the
bankruptcy judge, who, given the limitations under § 904 prohibiting
such changes, did not even contemplate this possibility.88 Scholars have
since responded to this absence of judicial activism in the Detroit
bankruptcy by renewing calls for a more robust Chapter 9 that further
empowers judges to restructure governing bodies.89
8 Emergency Manager, City of Detroit, Order No. 11, 2 (July 10, 2013), http://www.detroitmi.
gov/Portals/0/docs/EM/Order%201 .pdf [https: lperma.cc/ZCT3-W2JV].
* See Lisa L. Love & John L. Crompton, The Role of Quality of Life in Business (Re)Location
Decisions, 44 J. BUS. RES. 211, 219 (1999).
" See Gillette & Skeel, supra note 35, at 1187.
8 See id. at 1187-88.
87 The Board only recently resumed its role as an oversight body following a resolution from
the City Council. See Christine Ferretti, Council to Vote on Restoring Police Commission Powers,
DETROIT NEWS (Sept. 28, 2015, 11:30 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/2015/09/
28/council-vote-restoring-police-commission-powers/73001378/ [https://perma.cc/WLQ5-YMLJV].
8 However, in his opinion, Judge Rhodes did acknowledge the dire state of public safety
given the rampant crime in Detroit. See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 261 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
2014).
9 See Gillette & Skeel, supra note 35, at 1195-1202. The bankruptcy court, however,
exhibited different forms of activism previously unseen in Chapter 9 cases, but these maneuvers
did not touch upon the police problem in the City. Instead, they concerned a series of soft-power
dynamics intended to facilitate a speedy restructuring and exit from bankruptcy. One such move
was the appointment of Judge Gerald Rosen as mediator during negotiations between the City and
its creditors. As chief judge of the District Court for Eastern Michigan, Rosen would have heard all
appeals from creditors that the proposed restructuring plan violated their rights. See generally
Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 YALE J. REG. 55,
72-99 (2016) (identifying a number of soft-power dynamics akin to appointing Rosen as mediator
that expedited the bankruptcy proceedings and created leverage for the City during negotiations).
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There are two key takeaways from Orr's response to the police
crisis given that Chapter 9, as written, does not empower judges to
impose structural changes in government. First, the failure to remedy
the police governance problem in Detroit and abolish the Board
constituted a shortcoming in execution rather than a breakdown in
state insolvency law. The state, through Public Act 436, permitted Orr
to remake the City's government.9 0 Practical realities and political
prudence might explain his reluctance to make such changes, but the
fact remains that the emergency manager did not see fit to wield his
power so aggressively. If states want to exert control over their cities in
this manner, they should provide more explicit direction in the statutes
vesting authority in emergency managers.
Second, unless future versions of Chapter 9 exclude or at least
rewrite § 904, looking to federal bankruptcy law to correct the
shortcomings of state insolvency regimes does not appear to be a
sustainable response to problems in police governance within
distressed municipalities. Even if the financial obligations that drove
Detroit into bankruptcy were to disappear, the Board of Police
Commissioners would still present a formidable check on the power of
police chiefs. The structural dynamics that contributed to the city's
decline would still be in place despite concerted efforts to use
bankruptcy to put Detroit on a sustainable path. Acknowledging this
dynamic should prompt commentators to realize that the road to better
police governance probably goes through the state rather than federal
insolvency system.
B. Camden and the Challenge of Policing During Perennial Deficits
Camden's struggle to police its communities must be understood
within the context of the elaborate provisions New Jersey put in place
to keep its municipalities out of bankruptcy. 91 Only two New Jersey
entities have sought relief under Chapter 9 since 1980 and both
petitions were dismissed.92 The lack of a viable Chapter 9 alternative
within the state stems from New Jersey's decision to monitor its
municipalities closely through a series of debt default prevention
programs intended to redress problems before they become severe
enough to satisfy the Bankruptcy Code's eligibility requirements." As a
" See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
91 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27BBB-1-79 (2010).
92 JAMES E. SPIOTTO, ET AL., MUNICIPALITIES IN DISTRESS?: How STATES AND INVESTORS
DEAL WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES 171 (2012).
93 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:2-6 (2010).
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result, all of the police reforms the city recently put in place occurred in
the midst of crisis but outside bankruptcy.
Camden has operated within this intricate support system
continuously over the past decade. 94 The city's tax base has dwindled
due to corporate exits and a shrinking population as residents have
followed their corporate counterparts in search of better
opportunities.9 5 Meanwhile, expenses have held steady or increased,
thus creating a need for state aid to fill the deficit between what
Camden brings in through tax revenues and what it spends on public
services. 96 In addition, while New Jersey has provided considerable aid
to finance public safety initiatives within the City, Camden has
struggled to keep its residents safe.97 The City saw a welcome reverse
in crime statistics after reorganizing its police department in 2008 but
that progress gave way during the Great Recession when it
implemented a series of layoffs reducing the manpower of the force.98
By 2012, Camden's murder rate was higher than New York City's at six
homicides per 10,000 people, despite only having about 70,000
residents. 99
In response to this public safety problem, Camden took the drastic
move of disbanding its police force and adopting a regional model
whereby Camden County would be responsible for the safety of City
residents. 100 Even though local officials tend to resent emergency
managers who are appointed by the state during a financial crisis, 101
both Camden's officers and the overseers from Trenton agreed the City
needed to chart a different course to remedy a crime problem that had
spiraled out of control. 102 The impetus for dissolving the police force
stemmed from a perception that the current public safety
infrastructure was so inadequate that the city could not justify
allocating close to a third of its expenditures to shoddy police
services. 103 The City and state lacked the desire to continue financing
9 See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 13, at 36-38.
" See id. at 37.
96 See id. (noting that Camden city spends $150 million a year, but its annual tax revenue is
less than $25 million).
" See id.
9 See Kate Zernike, To Fight Crime, a Poor City Will Trade in Its Police, N.Y. TIMES




1' See supra note 69.
192 See John Rudolf, Chris Christie Pushes Camden Police Force to Disband, Despite Questions
Over New Plan's Finances, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 19, 2012, 2:38 AM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2012/11/19/chris-christie-camden-police n_2025372.html [https://perma.cc/TZ6J-2NMG].
103 See Zernike, supra note 98. (noting that in 2012, the year Camden opted for a regional
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such poor performance. Thus, when the local police union refused to
renegotiate expensive perks in its collective bargaining agreement,
Camden's mayor secured a vote by its City Council to initiate
proceedings to obtain cheaper police services from Camden County.104
Despite the initial resistance to regionalization of the police force,
the plan has thus far been heralded as a success. 105 From 2012 to 2015,
murders and robberies have declined fifty percent, aggravated assaults
with firearms are down close to forty percent, and sexual assaults are
down forty-five percent in Camden under the revamped Camden
County Police Department. 106 The ability to pool resources from the
county government and hire officers under more favorable terms
enabled Camden to acquire the additional manpower it lacked under
the former police governance structure. Given this success,
commentators have started referring to Camden as "the poster child for
police reform."107
Regardless of the merits of Camden's decision to resort to a
regional policing model, asking a bankruptcy court to solve the City's
police crisis would not have yielded positive results. Even assuming
Camden were located in a state that permitted its municipalities to file
for bankruptcy more readily, the court could not solve the problems
that have plagued the City for years. Bankruptcy would not be able to
restore businesses, bring back residents, de-annex territory so that
officers can police a smaller area more in line with a shrunken
population, or force neighboring taxpayers to subsidize the police
services Camden struggled to provide on its own. Just as the court
would be ill-equipped to restructure a police department, it would also
be powerless to implement the changes necessary to restore a tax base
financially capable of supporting an adequate police infrastructure.
Recognizing this limitation of Chapter 9 should prompt
commentators to direct their efforts toward how state insolvency
regimes can enhance their support of distressed municipalities. If, as
seems to be the case in Camden, regional approaches to policing can
overcome the resource-scarcity problem without compromising public
safety, then perhaps this is the better approach. Other municipalities
have followed this course with success similar to Camden's, as regional
model, its budget was $167 million, with $55 million set aside for police contracts, and only $21
million in tax revenues).
10 See Jason Laday, Camden City officials file plan to lay off 265 police officers-Updated,
SOUTH JERSEY TIMES (March 18, 2013, 12:15 PM), http://www.nj.com/gloucester-county/index.ssf/
2012/11/updated-camden city-officials.htm1 [https://perma.cc/A2FT-4ZAH].
'05 See, e.g., Maya Rhodan, How Camden Became the Poster Child for Police Reform, TIME
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resource pooling has emerged as a viable substitute for public services
provided by the municipality. 108
C. Stockton and the Problem of Police Pensions
Unlike the cities examined in the two previous cases studies,
bankruptcy can provide a sustainable remedy to the police crisis in
Stockton. When Stockton filed for bankruptcy in the summer of 2012, it
"was ground zero for the subprime mortgage crisis," with one of the
highest foreclosure rates in the nation, an unemployment rate of
twenty-two percent, and steep drops in property values. 109 But perhaps
the most troublesome aspect of this period was that Stockton had to
allocate funds away from police services and toward mounting pension
obligations. The City's pension system did not require contributions
from employees and was based on the final years of workers'
compensation. In some cases, the obligations included accrued vacation
and sick leave, resulting in the phenomenon of "pension spiking," in
which a retiree's pension could be greater than the salary of the
employee's final working year. 110 Essentially, Stockton experienced "a
trifecta of severe financial stressors-the housing crisis, overly
ambitious building projects, and out-of-control employee benefits.""n
Acute service delivery insolvency plagued the city as a result of
these developments. In 2010, the violent crime rate rose to 13.81 crimes
per 1000 residents while the national rate dropped. 112 Aggravated
assaults with a firearm rose from ninety nine in 2009 to 196 in 2011,
followed by an additional thirty percent increase in such crimes during
2012.113 The Police Department had about 1.1 officers per 1000
residents, compared to a national standard of 2.7 per 1000 residents. 114
Given the police shortage, officers, "during peak activity, responded
only to crimes-in-progress."115 In addition, abolishing the Narcotics
Enforcement Team led to increased drug traffic and less asset forfeiture
proceeds. Finally, reducing security camera monitoring from full-time
108 See, e.g., Heather Long, San Bernardino: A Bankrupt City Trying to Turn Itself Around,
CNN (Dec. 3, 2015, 7:43 PM), http: /money.cnn.com/2015/12/03/investing/san-bernardino-shooting-
bankruptcy/ [https://perma.cc/99PG-2E2R] (noting that San Bernardino recently outsourced its
fire department to the county government).
1o9 See In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 778 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013).
no See id. at 779.
... See Hopkins & Saavedra, supra note 19.
112 See In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. at 780.
n13 See id.
114 See id. at 780-81.
115 See In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 781 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013).
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to part-time limited the Department's ability to spot crime or follow
pursuits.116
Once the negotiations in bankruptcy began, Stockton residents
explored extra-judicial relief for their police crisis. Their efforts resulted
in the passing of Measure A, which called for a "sales tax increase that
provide[d] funding for bankruptcy recovery and the Marshall Plan on
Crime, allowing [the Stockton Police Department] to hire additional ...
officers to address issues of crime and provid[e] for the . . . safety of [the
City]."117 Stockton did not have a police governance model similar to the
one in Detroit, where the Board of Police Commissioners oversaw the
selection of police chiefs and other departmental affairs.1 18
Furthermore, unlike either Detroit or Camden, Stockton's population
expanded rather than contracted during its crisis period, which meant
that the shortage of police officers created a mismatch between the
geographic areas they needed to monitor and the number of people they
had to keep safe. 119 Nevertheless, given the police governance model
and the positive tax impacts of a growing population, the structural
conditions for police to be successful were satisfied. The City just
needed to find the funds to pay for their services despite the debt
burden.
The Marshall Plan was one response to this challenge. It aimed to
provide cost-effective substitutes to fill gaps in police services while the
City struggled to service its pension obligations and keep residents
safe. 120 In so doing, the Plan prompted a change in police strategy in
the run-up to bankruptcy rather than a change in structural decision
making, as was the case in Detroit under Orr.12 1 The aims of the
initiative were "[t]o break the cycle of chronic, generational crime and
improve public safety" in Stockton through a commitment to "stop,
interrupt and prevent homicides by targeting high-risk persons, places
" See id.
11 Kurt 0. Wilson, An Open Letter to the Community: Stockton Exits Bankruptcy, 2
(Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.stocktongov.com/files/OpenLetterCommunityCMExitBK2015_2
_25.pdf [https://perma.ce/H7YN-A55T].
" Stockton relied on its City Manager, who was appointed by the City Council, rather than
the Mayor to oversee the Police Department. See Stockton Municipal Code, Charter, and Civil
Service Rules § 1702, http:Ilqcode.us/codes/stockton/view.php?version=beta&view=&topic
=thecharterof the city-of stockton-xvii-1702 [https://perma.cc/KM3R-BKVV] ("Chief of Police
Appointment"). Typically, only one city official, like the mayor or the city manager, has formal
authority to oversee police departments, which is another reason why the governance model in
Detroit was so unusual. See Gillette & Skeel, supra note 35, at 1188.
1" See QuickFacts, Stockton (city), California, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 2, 2015),
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST0452 15/0675000,00 [https://perma.cc/GQS9-3UWU].
120 See STOCKTON CITY MANAGER'S OFFICE, MARSHALL PLAN ON CRIME: A VIOLENCE
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and situations."1 2 2 Accomplishing these goals entailed policing "'hot'
people, 'hot' places and situations that are causing problems in
[Stockton]." 1 2 3 The Marshall Plan supported the resource-strained
Stockton Police Department by sponsoring ceasefires, providing
"[p]eacekeepers focused on street outreach," identifying high-risk
violent individuals, among other community policing strategies
intended to "restor[e] [the] community, attract[ ] new businesses and
jobs, and improv[e] the quality of life for the entire region." 124 In
addition, the Marshall Plan assembled the Police Chief's Community
Advisory Council, which sought to inform officers of residents'
concerns. 125
Stockton residents supported the allocation of funds to improve
police services in a ballot initiative during bankruptcy, and the court
seized upon this fact when declaring the City eligible for Chapter 9
protection. 126 But in so doing, the court reduced the slice of the pie that
creditors could expect to receive under any settlement, because the
money allocated to pay for more officers reduced the funds available to
pay off lenders. 1 2 7 The only way creditors could come out ahead under
this arrangement was if they could convince the court that pension
obligations to officers and other workers needed to be restructured so
that more money would be available to private lenders during
negotiations.
Two obstacles stood in the way of creditors as they tried to release
some of the funds tied up by pension obligations. First, California law
blocked municipal governments from rejecting pension agreements in
bankruptcy. 128 Second, even if state law did not forbid municipal
debtors from lumping pension beneficiaries into the unsecured creditor
group, the court still needed to find that the plan was fair and




126 See In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 790 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013). Technically, under 11
U.S.C. § 943(b)(6), the court "shall" confirm plans that require electoral approval if voters have
already provided their consent. Because the citizens of Stockton gave their approval to pay more in
taxes to fund the Marshall Plan and other aspects of the bankruptcy recovery, the judge thought
there was probative evidence that an eventual plan could be confirmed without violating legal
doctrines arising under California's proposition system requiring voter approval of tax increases.
127 Creditors are typically blocked under the feasibility requirement from objecting to a plan
on the ground that the municipal debtor appropriated taxpayer money for its own purposes rather
than for offering lenders better terms under the restructuring plan. See supra Part II.A.2.
12 See CAL. GOV. CODE § 20487 (2016): "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no
contracting agency or public agency that becomes the subject of a case under the bankruptcy
provisions of Chapter 9 . . . shall reject any contract or agreement between that agency and the
[Board of Administration of the Public Employees' Retirement System] pursuant to Section 365 of
Title 11 . . .". See also CAL. Gov. CODE § 20021 (2016).
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equitable. 129 In perhaps the most intriguing part of the Stockton saga,
the court sided with the creditors on this first issue and held that the
Bankruptcy Code trumped a state law that made pension rejections in
bankruptcy ultra vires.130
But this aspect of the decision did not benefit dissenting creditors
in the end because the court ultimately confirmed a plan that left
pension obligations unchanged. 131 It looked at the fact that the City had
successfully amended collective bargaining agreements with police
officers as evidence that public employees were making compromises
during the formation of the reorganization plan. 132 As a result, the
judge thought he had evidence that police officers were not receiving
favorable treatment compared to private creditors who also had to
make sacrifices during negotiations. 1 33 In other words, leaving pensions
intact while changing other terms in collective bargaining
agreements-like cost of living adjustments and sick leave-was
deemed to be a valid "quid pro quo" from police officers that made the
additional losses imposed on dissenting creditors fair and equitable. 134
Regardless of whether the restructuring approved in the Stockton
bankruptcy ultimately solves the City's pension crisis or merely
provides short-term relief from its effects on public services, the court
was at least confronting a police problem that it was competent to
solve. Unlike the issues arising in the other two contexts, the problems
facing Stockton's police force were primarily financial rather than
structural in nature. The court oversaw the negotiations and
determined that no pension restructurings were required to make the
plan confirmable, even though it held that such an option was
permissible. The questions commentators need to ask going forward are
what might be the ramifications of such a precedent that leaves
pension obligations untouched, and whether bankruptcy and state
insolvency laws are properly equipped to contain potential fallouts. The
following section conducts this inquiry by contemplating doctrinal
changes that should enhance courts' abilities to cure the underlying
illness of a pension burden that contributes to a crisis in policing,
rather than merely treat the symptoms of such a problem.
129 See supra Part II.A.2.
130 See In re City of Stockton, 526 B.R. 35, 56-60 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015).
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IV. TOWARD MORE ROBUST FEDERAL AND STATE INSOLVENCY REGIMES
The municipalities examined in the previous section provide useful
data points that help illustrate the limits as well as the possibilities of
using insolvency laws to enact meaningful police reform in dire
circumstances. When the primary source of a police problem is too
much debt, as demonstrated by Stockton, then federal bankruptcy law
can alleviate this issue by appropriately restructuring the
municipality's obligations so that more capital can be freed to pay for
police services. However, the need to pay for such public goods should
not be pursued at all costs. Section A proposes a balancing test that
courts should use in determining the right approach, and Section B
considers various ideas for enhancing the powers of emergency
managers, as they are the ones who operate within the insolvency
system that is better equipped to solve structural breakdowns in local
governance.
A. Balancing Short-Term Safety Concerns Against Long-Term
Financing Needs When Dealing with Pension Burdens in
Bankruptcy
The favorable terms police pensioners receive during bankruptcy
negotiations could set a problematic precedent for several reasons. 135
First, succumbing to officers' demands that their pensions not be
reduced could signal that courts are privileging the immediate need to
improve the safety of the municipality over the city's long-term ability
to finance public initiatives by raising debt from creditors. 136 While a
court's impulse to make the city as safe as possible is understandable,
this desire should not be allowed to hollow out the fair and equitable
doctrine, because creditors will be chilled from making future
investments once they recognize that the law does not protect their
interests. 137
Second, while getting police pensioners to agree to a restructuring
proposal has the strategic value of accelerating negotiations, courts
might tolerate excessive writedowns by creditors because the benefits of
' In both the Detroit and Stockton restructurings, for example, police beneficiaries did not
have their pensions altered while other city pensioners agreed to reductions in what they were
owed. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 179 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014); In re City of Stockton, 526
B.R. at 62 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.2015).
136 See Teague Patterson, Stockton Shows that Bankruptcy is No Way to Cut Pension Debt,
SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 2, 2014, 4:00 PM), http:I/www.sacbee.com/opinion/op-ed/soapbox/article
3520829.html [https://perma.cc/3C9V-GEAM](discussing how city officials and the bankruptcy
judge found credible officers' threats to leave Stockton and work elsewhere so that they could still
keep their pension benefits).
137 See supra Part II.B.
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quickly exiting bankruptcy could outweigh the costs of allowing the
process to languish. 138 Police officers fared so well in the Detroit and
Stockton bankruptcies not because of any unique role they played in
the municipal order, but rather because they represented a large,
important interest group that could accelerate negotiations once they
were on board with their cities' plans. 139 Courts allowed municipal
debtors to exploit this strategic value despite the fact that police
pensions could be rejected. 140
Third, courts' willingness to appease police interests might blind
them to alternative measures that could save municipalities money
without compromising safety. For example, in the Detroit bankruptcy,
Judge Rhodes reiterated throughout his opinion confirming the plan of
reorganization that creditors needed to share in the collective sacrifice
to make Detroit safe and solvent. 141 But the extent to which creditors
sacrificed their interests to realize the court's vision of public safety
seems troubling when other alternatives might have been available. In
theory, Detroit did not need its own police force immediately after
exiting bankruptcy when other segments of Wayne County or the state
of Michigan itself could have offered police services for an interim
period until the City's police department was financially ready to
resume responsibilities. Indeed, this solution is similar to the approach
taken by Camden outside of bankruptcy. 142 Even if one believes the
strategy is inappropriate as a permanent police reform, such an
approach could still promote short-term safety within a city while
avoiding the sorts of signals that might chill creditors from lending to
municipal debtors.
One way to solve the problem of privileging police pensions over
other municipal obligations could be to use a balancing test that
requires a court to weigh immediate public safety needs against long-
term financing concerns tied to the city's ability to pay for police
services. Such a framework would change how future bankruptcy
judges and mediators deal with a large interest group that has
immense strategic value during negotiations. It would also increase the
strength of the fair and equitable doctrine.
The balancing test could be applied in a series of ways. First,
courts could hold that agreements to reduce officers' cost of living
'3 See Bomey & Helms, supra note 40 (pointing out that police consent to the proposed
restructuring gave the plan momentum that could lead to a swift conclusion of negotiations
despite creditors' objections to its terms).
"9 See supra Part II.B.
"0 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
141 See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 182 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
142 See Rudolf, supra note 102.
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adjustments are per se insufficient concessions if they do not also
include amendments to pension obligations. Under a public choice
theory of jurisprudence, judges should rule against medium-sized, well-
organized interests who can get legislators to introduce favorable laws
like those in Michigan and California that prohibited pensions from
being rejected in bankruptcy. 143 Police officers and their unions likely
fit into this category given their size, organizational capacity, and
importance as a voting bloc in local and state affairs. Alternatively, if a
court were hesitant to embrace a per se rule meant to apply in the
context-sensitive environment of a municipal bankruptcy, then the
court could adopt a rebuttable presumption that failing to adjust
pension obligations does not make the plan of reorganization fair and
equitable.
Finally, a court could balance the municipality's long-term
interests in its ability to access credit markets against its immediate
safety needs by simply asking whether the terms of the plan are likely
to have a chilling effect on creditors. If investors will be unlikely to lend
to municipal debtors because the plan would appear grossly inattentive
to creditors' interests from the perspective of future lenders, then the
court should not confirm it.
Opponents of this proposal could challenge it on several grounds.
For example, this solution fails to appreciate a fundamental difference
between Chapter 9 and the other sections of the Bankruptcy Code,
which is that courts are not supposed to balance the interest of
creditors against the interests of the municipality. 14 4 Instead, the
interests of the municipality should trump other concerns.145 As a
result, a balancing test like the one proposed here would be
inappropriate.
This challenge is overcome by the fact that the current fair and
equitable doctrine does not envision a balancing of the sort
contemplated, which is precisely the problem with recent case law. The
balancing test proposed is thus an effort to prompt a rethinking of what
Chapter 9 can do for future insolvent municipalities that will likely
have to confront pension problems of their own. In a regime where
governmental changes can be proposed only awkwardly at best given
the limitations under § 904, creditors will be able to tell whether the
14 See EAMONN BUTLER, PUBLIC CHOICE: A PRIMER 22-23 (2012), available at
http://www.iea.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/files/IEA%20Public%2Choice%20web%20co
mplete%2029.1.12.pdf [https://perma.cc/7568-B9SN].
144 See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 24, at ¶ 900.01(2) ("However, unlike chapter 11,
chapter 9 does not attempt to balance the rights of the municipality and its creditors. In fact, a
dissatisfied creditor is in large measure provided with only one remedy in a chapter 9 case, i.e.,
seeking dismissal of the chapter 9 case.").
141 See id.
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plan confirmed solves a police problem or just postpones the next
bankruptcy filing because the city will again experience service delivery
insolvency. As a result, the balancing test could coax lenders into
extending credit at more favorable terms for municipal debtors despite
reservations engendered by recent police-friendly plans of
reorganization.
There are other foreseeable objections to this proposal. First, all
parties involved in a bankruptcy have an interest in ending the
negotiations as quickly as possible. 146 Thus, if there is strategic value in
getting pension holders on board with a plan, then the short-term
benefits might outweigh the costs. Second, if the municipality cannot
solve its crime problem soon after it exits bankruptcy, then it is not
likely to remain solvent given the connection between public safety and
financial stability. Plans of reorganization that favor police officers
should therefore be tolerated even if they make borrowing more
expensive because officer investment will be enhanced. Third, states
might react to this balancing test by making it harder for
municipalities to enter bankruptcy.147
Solving these issues merely requires counseling judges to be
mindful of how creditors will view the municipality as a credit risk
after bankruptcy. The aim of the process is to put the city in a position
in which it can go to creditors and raise the capital it needs to pay for
municipal services, rather than relying on perpetual state aid to
finance initiatives. Indeed, having access to capital markets is a more
sustainable approach to municipal health than relying on the goodwill
of charities and private philanthropists to make the bankruptcy less
painful for police officers while potentially alienating creditors who will
be needed in the future.14 8
B. Emergency Managers as Structural Police Reformers
If the police problem in a municipality is something other than
excessive debt and thus one that a bankruptcy court is not equipped to
confront, then emergency managers should assume the role of reformer.
Furthermore, states should be clear in their insolvency statutes that
emergency managers are empowered to make changes in police
governance as they see fit.
Under the interpretation of Public Act 436 advanced by this
Comment, Orr had authority to overhaul the Detroit Police
"6 See supra notes 136-138 and accompanying text.
147 See supra Part II.B.
14 See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 176 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (Detroit's "Grand
Bargain" during bankruptcy consisted of a series of donations from private charities and wealthy
individuals that were intended to alleviate the City's burden of settling with its creditors).
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Department's organizational structure, not just appoint new people to
occupy various positions within the existing framework. 149 While Orr
used his power to appoint his desired police chief and then vested the
new leader with the ability to bypass the Board of Police
Commissioners, he should have gone further and disbanded the body
for three reasons.
First, the emergency manager serves a dual purpose under state
insolvency law: to shepherd the municipality through its crisis and to
put it in a position to maintain solvency after emerging from
receivership.15 0 Appointing a new police chief is one way to solve the
short-term leadership crisis, but leaving the underlying structure in
place might negate efforts to put the city in a good long-term
governance position no matter who is in charge. Furthermore, the
adage of "never letting a serious crisis go to waste" seems to have
greater resonance in the context of a state-declared financial
emergency. 15 1 The emergency manager should seize this moment as an
opportunity to get the municipality off the course that led it to distress
in the first place.
Second, one lesson from Detroit's bankruptcy is that the structural
changes to the municipality's government likely need to be
implemented before the Chapter 9 petition is filed because the
bankruptcy court will focus on financial rather than governance
matters. 152 This narrow focus could be due to the language of § 904
prohibiting bankruptcy judges from interfering with the political affairs
of a municipality,1 5 3 the fact that governance matters might be
secondary to financial concerns in a bankruptcy as large as Detroit's, or
just from the bankruptcy judge's sense that restraint is more
appropriate than activism. Whatever the reason, the time for
governmental reforms-if such reforms are deemed necessary-appears
limited to the receivership window. It is unwise to leave the job to a
different agent of institutional change given the hesitance to confront
such issues in the Detroit episode.15 4
Third, the emergency manager might be a normatively preferable
reformer compared to the bankruptcy judge. In Detroit's case, Orr had
a considerable amount of time to gather information, diagnose
structural problems ailing the city, build coalitions, and take other
149 See MICH. COMvP. LAWS § 141.1549(9)(2) (2012).
150 See Gillette, supra note 69, at 1444-45.
"' See Rahm Emanuel, You Never Want a Serious Crisis to Go to Waste, YOUTUBE (Feb. 9,
2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-1yeA-kHHLow [https://perma.cc/AX8R-MY4K].
152 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
s See 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2010).
15 See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
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steps to facilitate changes that he thought were necessary. 15 5 By
contrast, the bankruptcy judge seeks to conclude the proceedings as
quickly as possible and delegates the role of mediator to a third
party.156 While the judge can communicate what he or she thinks is
necessary to put the municipality on a sustainable path, the emergency
manager seems to occupy a preferable institutional position for
implementing such reforms.
Someone opposed to an emergency manager wielding power to
reconfigure the organizational structure of a police force would likely
object to this solution in several ways. First, he or she might argue that
Public Act 436 only sanctions strategic changes in policing, not reforms
of the City Charter. This challenge can be overcome by noting that the
plain language of the statute supports an interpretation that permits
revisions of the City Charter. 15 7 Furthermore, since the statute does not
include language limiting the emergency manager's power, an
interpretation similar to the one advocated in this Comment would
arguably not do violence to the text.s15
Second, the approach advocated here could be challenged on
antidemocratic grounds. This critique is widespread among opponents
of state takeover boards or aggressive state laws governing municipal
insolvency. 159 It presumes that laws flowing from a democratic process
are preferable over laws that bypass the municipal legislative
process. 160 However, a state-declared financial emergency within the
municipality could signal the local democratic process is broken. 16 1
Unilateral reforms that address underlying structural breakdowns
could be in the interests of citizens whose system of government has
failed them or who have suffered under poor leadership. 162 Further, the
emergency manager can use his or her judgment to see if there is a
broad mandate from residents or political officeholders to bring
structural changes. He or she can gather data to see what is working
and what is hindering effective policing in a municipality before
initiating changes in police governance. Serving as a quasi-dictator
15 See Nathan Bomey et al., Detroit's New Bankruptcy Plan Lowers Payouts, USA TODAY
(Mar. 31, 2014), http: //www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/03/3 1/detroit-new-bankruptcy-
exit-plan/7140383/ [https://perma.cc/RV45-F4B7].
"6 See supra Part II.B.
157 MICH. CoMp. LAws § 141.1549(9)(1) (2012) (the emergency manager shall "have broad
powers . . . to assure the . . . local government's capacity to provide or cause to be provided
necessary governmental services essential to the public . . . safety").
18 See Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 529 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
' See Anderson, supra note 3, at 1151-57.
See Gillette, supra note 69, at 1433.
'6 See McConnell & Picker, supra note 5, at 472.
162 See Gillette, supra note 69, at 1433.
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does not mean the emergency manager will necessarily implement
nonsensical changes. 16 3 Instead, the emergency manager can gather
information to determine what would constitute sensible reforms. An
emergency manager is arguably unlikely to make a city worse off if its
economic condition is severe enough to warrant state intervention, and
local officials still retain the ability to override changes the emergency
manager puts in place if they prove unworkable or detrimental.
Finally, an opponent might also argue that emergency managers
should not be so quick to use the crisis situation to abolish an
institution like the Board of Police Commissioners. Given that Detroit's
two previous police chiefs left office in scandal, residents should be
thankful there was an institutional check on the Police Department to
keep it from careening even further out of control. 164 This response fails
to consider that the appropriate solution to corruption or
mismanagement is not necessarily another external body. Rather,
mayors or city councils can provide the same oversight function without
handcuffing the police chief's ability to manage the force.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has attempted to provide an overview of recent
municipal crises that could be harbingers of challenges still to come. In
so doing, it has contemplated how the tools of state insolvency law and
bankruptcy can be harnessed to improve police services in the midst of
financial distress. Such proposals have followed from the principle that
bankruptcy law cannot solve non-bankruptcy problems. In other words,
municipalities with dwindling populations, corruption that diverts
attention away from effective allocations of public funds, and other
social ills should not look first to their local insolvency regimes and
Chapter 9 for redress. Indeed, the remedies they seek probably lie
elsewhere. 165 Nevertheless, to the extent a city in crisis can use state
insolvency laws and Chapter 9 to fill deficits in police services, this
Comment has advanced proposals that could be of use. Regardless of
their merits, these proposed solutions will not be of much value if the
underlying logic and limits of the bodies of law they are intended to
improve are ignored. If these principles are put at the forefront of
reform initiatives, the challenge of policing in the midst of crisis should
become a little more manageable.
163 See id. at 1445-61.
14 See Rebecca Cook, Detroit Police Chief Ralph Godbee Resigns Amid Sex Scandal, NBC
NEWS (Oct. 8, 2012), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/news/2012/10/08/ 14298235-detroit-police-chief-
ralph-godbee-resigns-amid-sex-scandal?lite [https://perma. cc/4HQB-UZ88].
166 See BAIRD, supra note 6, at 276 ("Legal rules cannot cure non-legal problems").
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